Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The current federal Rule and the state alibi notice rules all require a defendant who intends to present an alibi defense to inform the prosecutor of that intention at some specified date before trial and to provide a list of alibi witnesses he intends to call. Under most alibi notice rules, a defendant's failure to give timely pretrial notice of an alibi defense may result in the exclusion of the defendant's alibi evidence at trial. 7 The United States Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of alibi notice rules in general, holding that a requirement of notice by defendants does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." The Court has explicitly reserved judgment, however, on the constitutionality of the exclusion of alibi evidence as a sanction for noncompliance with the alibi notice rule.' In Alicea v. Gagnon, e the Seventh Circuit ruled that this exclusion, sometimes called the preclusion sanction," in a Wisconsin alibi notice statute 12 was a denial of the defendant's constitustein, supra note 2, at 29. ' Most jurisdictions also provide for other limited forms of criminal discovery, see supra note 3, but only those rules specifically addressing the discovery of alibi information are analyzed here.
7See, e.g., ILL. Sup. CT. R. 413(d), 415(g)(i). Of the 41 states which have some form of alibi notice rule, 17 states, including Illinois, allow both the defendant's own alibi testimony as well as his witnesses' testimony to be excluded. Twenty-four states protect the defendant's testimony from exclusion, but allow the defendant's witnesses' testimony to be excluded if the defendant has not complied with the rule. See infra Appendix.
8 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970) . The Court has held that due process imposes a duty on prosecutors to provide reciprocal alibi discovery to the defendants. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973) .
9 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970); see also Taliaferro v. Maryland, 103 S. Ct. 2114 Ct. , 2114 Ct. -15 (1983 ) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (certiorari should be granted to consider whether use of the preclusion sanction to exclude the testimony of defendant's sole alibi witness violated his right to offer witnesses as guaranteed by the sixth amendment).
10 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982) . 11 The term "preclusion sanction" appears to have been used first in Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J.
(1972).
Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(8) . The rule provides: Notice of alibi. (a) If the defendant intends to rely upon an alibi as a defense, the defendant shall give notice to the district attorney at the arraignment or at least 15 days before trial stating particularly the place where the defendant claims to have been when the crime is alleged to have been committed together with the names and addresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known. If at the close of the state's case the defendant withdraws the alibi or if at the close of the defendant's case the defendant does tional right to testify in his own behalf. 13 The court endorsed the theory that Wisconsin's interest in truthful alibis and more efficient trials is not sufficient to justify a denial of the accused's right to present a defense. 14 This comment suggests that the preclusion sanction is not a denial of a constitutional right but merely the consequence of a defendant's failure to assert the constitutional right at the appropriate point in the litigation. Part I provides an overview of the alibi notice rules in effect in state and federal courts. Part II reviews the constitutional justifications for both the alibi notice rule and the preclusion sanction, and outlines the sixth amendment challenges to the sanction. Part III defends the sanction. Its analysis balances the cost to the defendant of providing pretrial alibi notice against the benefits that notice affords the criminal justice system. Because the defendant's compliance costs are low and the benefits to the criminal justice system are great, it is appropriate to require pretrial notice as a condition to asserting the right to present an alibi defense. By failing to assert that right at the appropriate time, the defendant forfeits the right; the sanction operates merely to enforce the forfeiture. Moreover, as Part III demonstrates, none of the alternative sanctions proposed by critics of the preclusion sanction would enforce the alibi notice rule effectively. Because procedural rules that permit such forfeiture are acceptable not call some or any of the alibi witnesses, the state shall not comment on the defendant's withdrawal or on the failure to call some or any of the alibi witnesses. The state shall not call any alibi witnesses not called by the defendant for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility with regard to the alibi notice. Nothing in this section may prohibit the state from calling said alibi witnesses for any other purpose.
(b) In default of such notice, no evidence of the alibi shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise.
(c) The court may enlarge the time for filing a notice of alibi as provided in par. (a) for cause.
(d) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice of alibi, or such other time as the court orders, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant notice in writing of the names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses whom the state proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi. In default of such notice, no rebuttal evidence on the alibi issue shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise. The Wisconsin rule is similar to most other state rules. See infra Appendix. 13 The Alicea court, in a thorough analysis discussed in greater detail infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text, held that the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments provided the basis for the right to testify in one's own behalf. 675 F.2d at 923. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that such a right exists, id. at 920, but cited dicta from several Supreme Court opinions as supporting its conclusions and found that the majority of the lower federal courts which have considered the question have concluded that such a right exists, id. at 920-23.
14 Id. at 923-25.
[51: 254 1984] Alibi Notice Rules only when the defendant's compliance costs are low, Part IV discusses three proposals for reducing the compliance costs of the alibi notice rule. 20 1974 Proposed Rules, supra note 18, at 293 (proposed Rule 12.1 advisory committee note). When the 1962 proposal was made, critics asserted that despite the widespread approval by state courts of alibi notice rules "such a notice invaded the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and was fundamentally unfair to defendants." Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J. 477, 497 . The fear of a fifth amendment violation proved to be unfounded. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ). Critics also expressed concern that intensive government investigation following notice of an alibi would discourage witnesses from volunteering information. Everett, supra, at 498. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 requires the prosecutor, if he wishes to trigger the alibi notice rule, to make a written demand of the defendant concerning any alibi defense and to state the time, date, and place at which the offense was committed. 2 2 The prosecutor is required to reciprocate by releasing alibi rebuttal information. 23 The defendant and prosecutor are both under a continuing duty to provide the names and addresses of witnesses that they intend to rely on to establish the defendant's location at the time the crime was committed. 2 4 If either party fails to comply with the rule, the judge may exclude the testimony of any alibi or 2, 3(13), 89 Stat. 370, 370, (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1). The 1974 Supreme Court orders promulgating the 1975 rules are reprinted at FEDERAL RULES 10-11 (West 1981) .
I. FEDERAL AND STATE ALIBI NOTICE RULES
22 (a) Notice by Defendant. Upon written demand of the attorney for the government stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the government a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi. FED. R. CraM. P. 12.1(a).
Initiation by the prosecutor is essential; one court has held that a defendant's voluntary offer of his alibi witnesses cannot substitute for the government's demand, and hence does not trigger the prosecutor's reciprocal duty to disclose alibi information as provided by FED. R. CRiM. P. 12.1(b), quoted infra note 23. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1058 -59 (5th Cir. 1981 .
While rule 12.1 as originally proposed by the Supreme Court required the defendant to initiate the process by informing the prosecutor of his intention to rely on an alibi defense, see 1974 Proposed Rules, supra note 18, at 292 (Proposed Rule 12.1(a) begins: "If a defendant intends to rely on the defense of alibi, he shall. . . notify the attorney for the government . . . ."), the House of Representatives created the "prosecution-triggered" process currently in effect, H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975) 23 (b) Disclosure of Information and Witness. Within ten days thereafter, but in no event less than ten days before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for the government shall serve upon the defendant or his attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the government intends to rely to establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any other witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi witness. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(b) 24 (c) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If prior to or during trial, a party learns of an additional witness whose identity, if known, should have been included in the information furnished under subdivision (a) or (b), the party shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney of the existence and identity of such additional witness. FED. R. CraM. P. 12.1(c).
alibi-rebuttal witness except the defendant. 2 For good cause shown, the trial judge may grant an exemption from any of the above rules. 26 Finally, rule 12.1 renders inadmissible at trial evidence of the defendant's intention, as indicated by pretrial notice, to rely upon an alibi that is never actually presented. 27 Alibi notice rules sharing many of the elements of the federal rule are in effect in forty-one states and the District of Columbia. 2 The remaining nine states have no alibi notice rules. 29 In twentyfour of the states with alibi notice rules and in the District of Columbia, the prosecutor must initiate the process by requesting alibi information from the defendant; 30 the remaining seventeen states' 25 (d) Failure to Comply. Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify in his own behalf.
26 (e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to any of the requirements of subdivisions (a) 812 (1942) .
35 In Maine, for example, the response to the defendant's violation of the rule is simply that the court "may take appropriate action." ME. R. CaiM. P. 16A(b nor his rights to due process or fundamental fairness. 43 The Court rejected the due process argument summarily, since the notice rule applied to the prosecution as well as to the defendant." As to the fifth amendment claim, the Court reasoned that the rule simply required the defendant to make the same tactical choice he would otherwise make at trial, a choice between not introducing evidence at all and introducing it with the attendant danger of revealing the identity of witnesses and risking the emergence of damaging information; 4 5 that choice had never been considered a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 0 discretion by trial courts). Florida's rule is typical of a number of state rules in that it is prosecutor-triggered, specifically exempts the defendant's own testimony from exclusion, specifically states that witnesses whose names and address are not disclosed may be barred from testifying, provides for a continuing duty to disclose, imposes a reciprocal duty on the prosecutor, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, and allows waiver of the exclusion sanction for good cause shown. § 135.455 (1981) ), quoted in Wardius, 412 U.S. at 472 n.3, to be unconstitutional due to its failure to provide reciprocal discovery rights to the defendant. The majority stated that "[i]t is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State." Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476.
B. The Constitutionality of the Preclusion Sanction
In contrast to the alibi notice rule, the preclusion sanction that enforces it in most jurisdictions has come under increasing attack in recent years as a violation of a defendant's right to present a defense. Commentators have asserted that the state's interest in encouraging truthful alibis and in the efficient administration of justice does not outweigh the constitutional right of the accused to defend himself. 47 This section will survey the development of the constitutional attack on the preclusion sanction beginning with the sanction's early and longstanding acceptance, through the Supreme Court's recognition of the defendant's right to present a defense, and culminating in the Seventh Circuit's recent decision striking down the preclusion sanction in Alicea v. Gagnon. 48 1. (1974) (discussing the alibi notice rule and arguing that the use of alternatives to the preclusion sanction in enforcing the notice rule is required in light of the history and recent understanding of the compulsory process clause); Note, supra note 11 (arguing that the "credibility of the evidence" justification for the preclusion sanction fails in the face of the construction given the compulsory process clause in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and that the preclusion sanction constitutes an unconstitutional condition infringing due process since less drastic means of protecting state interests are available 53 for example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals compared alibi notice to conditioning the constitutional right to a jury trial on a defendant's timely request for a jury. 54 In neither case, concluded the court, is the procedural condition antithetical to the constitutional right.
55
Only one federal court had addressed the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction before the Seventh Circuit considered the issue in Alicea v. Gagnon. 6 In Rider v. Crouse, 57 the Tenth Circuit relied on a similar "reasonable condition" rationale to uphold the sanction. The habeas corpus petitioner in Rider argued that his constitutional right to testify about his alibi was improperly denied at his trial . 5 The Tenth Circuit rejected that claim, reasoning:
The purpose of a statute like [the Kansas rule] concerning notice of alibi is to prevent a last minute surprise of an alibi defense. It does not deny an accused the right to such a defense but merely prescribes notice as a prerequisite thereto.
The validity of such statutes is generally upheld. 9 dant presenting a truthful alibi is not harmed by a pretrial notice requirement, seeming to assume that any alibi raised at trial without prior notice would be untruthful. . 1981) , decided a year before Alicea, the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction in part on the ground that the exclusion of defense witnesses as a sanction for the violation of a pretrial discovery order violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process. The Davis trial court had refused to admit testimony of defendant's character witnesses because their names had not been disclosed to the prosecutor before trial, in violation of a discovery order requiring such disclosure, and because their testimony would be needlessly cumulative. Id. at 242. The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court not only abused its discretion in finding no probative value in the evidence, id. at 243-45, but was also unjustified in unilaterally revoking the right to present defense witnesses simply as a means to punish the failure to comply with the discovery order, id. at 242-43. ton v. Texas, 60 the Supreme Court has suggested that such a right may indeed by found in the fifth, 61 sixth, 2 and fourteenth 3 amendments. The right is composed of at least two elements: the right to call witnesses and the right to testify in one's own defense. The defendant in Washington challenged a Texas statutory rule 64 barring principals, accomplices, and accessories to the same crime from testifying for each other. The apparent justification for the rule was that accomplices, because of their inherent interest in the result, were not credible witnesses.
6 5 The Court held that the compulsory process clause not only repudiates the ancient common law rule barring the defendant from calling witnesses in his favor, 6 it also prohibits "arbitrary" disqualification of any category of witnesses presumed a priori to be untrustworthy. 6 7 In 1973 the Supreme Court relied on the due process clause to strike down a Mississippi voucher rule that prevented a defendant from calling witnesses to impeach the damaging testimony of one of his own witnesses. 68 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the principle of compulsory process and construed it as a necessary element of due process, concluding that "the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. ' 
").
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to. . .have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . ."). In relying on the compulsory process clause in Washington, the court construed that clause for the first time in 120 years. See Westen, supra note 47, at 108-11 (discussing the prior Supreme Court rulings on the compulsory process clause).
'a U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
" Tax 
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The right to testify. Twenty-four out of the 41 states that have alibi notice rules do specifically reserve to the defendant the right to testify regarding his alibi. See infra Appendix. The court specifically refrained from addressing this difference in Wisconsin's alibi notice rules from the alibi notice rules of other states. Alicea, 675 F.2d at 917 n.6. The decision, therefore, has little direct precedential value for those states whose preclusion sanction applies only to witnesses called by the defendant. Presumably, however, under the Alicea balance test, the defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses would outweigh the state's interest in efficiency, just as the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf outweighs the state's interest in efficiency, because the cost to the defendant in terms of potential lost liberty is greater than the administrative benefits to the state. On the other hand, the Alicea court seemed to suggest that the defendant's own right to testify might be stronger than his right to call other witnesses because it is the defendant's own freedom which "hangs in the balance" of the trial. Id. at 923. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) , upholding a defendant's right to reject court-appointed counsel and conduct his own defense, also suggests that the participation of the defendant in the proceedings must be accorded a special weight when the defendant wishes to participate. Id. at 812-34. Because the right to call witnesses, or "compulsory process," however, is grounded directly in the language of the sixth amendment and more strongly supported by history, the Alicea balance would likely be struck at least as deferentially toward the defendant's right to call witnesses as it was in Alicea itself toward his right to testify.
he had not left home at the time the crime occurred and to deny committing the robbery, the jury did not receive instructions concerning an alibi defense and Alicea was convicted." 3 In his habeas corpus petition to the Seventh Circuit, Alicea challenged the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction.
8 4 Establishing a defendant's constitutional right to testify on his own behalf was crucial to Alicea's case since state habeas corpus petitioners may obtain review in federal court only if they allege the deprivation of a constitutional right.
8 5 After thorough analysis and review of the precedents," 8 the court concluded that the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments supported a constitutional right to testify in one's own behalf.
8 7 The court reasoned: "If the search for truth is to have meaning, surely the most important figure in the controversy, whose very freedom hangs in the balance, must have a right to participate directly." 88 Having established the constitutional right, the court then weighed the state's interest supporting the preclusion sanction against the sanction's effect on the right. 8 " The court emphasized that in balancing federal constitutional rights and state procedural rules, "the competing state interests must be substantial to overcome the claims of the defendant." 90 Wisconsin asserted interests § 2255 (1976) provides different conditions for a federal prisoner seeking comparable post-conviction review in federal court. The constitutional dimensions of a right also have an impact on areas other than habeas corpus petitions. For example, courts are more likely to impose a lower standard for an effective waiver of a right that is merely statutory, rather than constitutional. See Hammerman, supra note 70, at 684-86. 88 In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit "partially overruled" an earlier Seventh Circuit case, Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969) , which held that the privilege of the accused to testify is "merely statutory." Alicea, 675 F.2d at 923. The court reasoned that Sims was "obsolete" because it had been decided before the Supreme Court's persuasive dicta in [51:254
Alibi Notice Rules in preventing false alibis and in facilitating the efficient administration of justice. The court held these interests insufficient to defeat the defendant's right to testify, finding that the state, with its superior investigatory power, would rarely be surprised by the presentation of truthful alibi, 91 and that an unsubstantiated alibi, such as the one Alicea attempted to introduce by his testimony alone, could hardly hinder the state's prosecutorial efforts given the prosecution's opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the defendant at trial. 92 The court noted that the state could always seek a continuance for further investigation if the surprise alibi seriously prejudiced its case. 9 " Having thus found that the state's ihterest in precluding the testimony was unsubstantial, and that any damage to the prosecution through undisclosed testimony was probably de minimis, 9 4 the court held that the defendant's alibi testimony could not be precluded. 9 5
III. THE PRECLUSION SANCTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Alicea balances the value to the state of alibi notice against the cost to the defendant of losing his right to testify or to present witnesses to establish an alibi defense. Because the Alicea court found very few real benefits to the state from the rule, it reasoned that the cost to the defendant of excluding his testimony outweighed these slight benefits."' Yet this analysis seriously misconstrues the cost an alibi notice rule imposes on the defendant. If the defendant complies with the notice rule, he loses only the ability to ' Id. at 924. The court also noted that "[a]s an essential part of its case, the state must prove a defendant's presence during the commission of an alleged crime, proof which invariably requires pretrial investigation and preparation. Armed with this evidence, the state is in a formidable position to refute a defendant's unexpected alibi testimony ...... Id. The court did not, however, address the possibility of a defendant being able to raise a reasonable doubt through such unexpected testimony, see supra note 2, a possibility that might be reduced if the prosecutor has sufficient warning of the details of the alibi testimony.
" Alicea, 675 F.2d at 924. " While a response to the Seventh Circuit's analysis is presented infra notes 96-131 and accompanying text, it should be noted here that the Alicea court's finding that the state interest served by an alibi notice rule is minimal is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's finding in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970) , that such rules further the search for truth in criminal trials and the efficient administration of justice.
" Alicea, 675 F.2d at 925-26. Nonetheless, even though Alicea's constitutional right to testify had been violated, the court noted that the evidence against him was overwhelming. Moreover, Alicea had been able to introduce certain alibi testimony despite the preclusive ruling. For these reasons, the court found that the deprivation constituted harmless error and affirmed the conviction. Id.
90 Alicea, 675 F.2d at 924.
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The University of Chicago Law Review keep his intention of presenting an alibi defense secret until the trial itself. It is solely as the result of his failure to comply with rule that he forfeits his right to present alibi evidence. This Part will show that the balancing test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Alicea, 9 7 if carried to its logical conclusion, would condemn as violative of defendants' constitutional rights not only use of the preclusion sanction for violations of the alibi notice rule, but also a host of other well-accepted principles of criminal procedure.
A. Procedural Default and Balancing in Other Contexts
To evaluate the Alicea test it is first necessary to recognize the aspects of procedural default present in alibi notice rules. Procedural default has been defined as the loss of a right through a failure by an accused or his representative to assert that right in a prescribed manner or at a required time."' By creating an alibi notice rule, the state dictates when an intention to offer alibi evidence may be announced; 9 9 a defendant's failure to provide notice at that time operates as a forfeiture of the right to present alibi testimony, including, in some states, the defendant's own testimony, at trial. The forfeiture operates automatically; no state official will ask the defendant why he has not given notice.
A number of considerations justify the deprivation of a constitutional right by procedural default. A defendant and his counsel necessarily make many tactical decisions in the course of a prosecution, including decisions not to assert certain constitutional rights. It would be far too time-consuming and inefficient to require judges to inquire specifically into a defendant's understanding of and concurrence in all of those decisions. 0 0 At the same 97 The Alicea balancing test seems first to have been proposed by the author of a 1972 student note. See Note, supra note 11. This analysis can be applied to any procedural rule that denies the defendant the ability to exercise a constitutional right based on an earlier failure to assert the right. See infra note 100.
98 Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PENN. L. REv. 473, 474-77, 513-14 (1978) .
: Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970) . 100 See Spritzer, supra note 98, at 476-77. Procedural default should be distinguished from waiver, the other principal means by which a defendant is deemed to have foregone a constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), provides the classic definition of waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464. Waiver requires an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced in foregoing the right. See Spritzer, supra note 98, at 475. The Supreme Court has required an affirmative waiver in a number of contexts, for example, the right to counsel, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) , the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) , and the surrender of trial rights by a guilty plea, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, [51:254 Alibi Notice Rules time procedures exist for the defendant to assert certain rights at relatively less cost. Therefore, procedural default furthers efficiency and finality at trial.
The concept of procedural default is integral to at least two other familiar aspects of criminal procedure: contemporaneous-objection rules and the rules governing application for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. A defendant is required, under a contemporaneous-objection rule, to object to the introduction of inadmissible evidence by the prosecutor or to the use of improper jury instructions at the time the error is made; if he fails to object at that time he forfeits the right to object later in the trial or on appeal. 101 A defendant may also lose the opportunity to submit evidence
(1969).
The distinction between waiver and procedural default has often been blurred in practice. Some commentators have used the word "waiver" to include both waiver as defined in L. REv. 1214 L. REv. , 1214 L. REv. -15 (1977 (discussing the distinction between waiver and forfeiture of constitutional rights). The term waiver has also been employed to describe the loss of a right through inaction under a default standard. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Tax. L. REV. 193, 194-204 (1977) . For example, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure creates a procedural default standard for the assertion of several defenses, objections, and requests that are "capable of determination without the trial of the general issue." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). These include defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, motions to suppress evidence, requests for discovery under FED. R. CraM. P. 16, and requests for a severance of charges or defenses under FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. The reasons for the procedural default standard of Rule 12 are typical, and include preventing unnecessary trials, deterring interruption of a trial for any objection relating to the institution and presentation of the charge, and eliminating from trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt. See Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir. 1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee note on 1974 Amendment; see also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (approving preclusion sanction of Rule 12), discussed infra note 116. The rule provides that a failure to raise these defenses, objections, and requests in a timely manner "shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." FED. R. CRim. P. 12(0. The rule misapplies waiver terminology; forfeiture of a right without a formal review of the defendant's voluntariness and awareness constitutes procedural default.
101 See, e.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 30 ("No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124 (1982) (A failure to object contemporaneously to improper jury instructions causes forfeiture of the objection under Ohio law;, defendant must demonstrate "cause" for the default to raise the objection under federal habeas corpus.); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87-90 (1977) (same for failure to object in a timely fashion to the use of an improperly obtained confession); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448-53 (1965) (same for failure to object to illegally obtained evidence).
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The University of Chicago Law Review to the fact-finder if he fails to do so at his first trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits a new trial, at the request of the defendant, if newly discovered evidence becomes available. 102 Even after the enactment of the rule, however, courts have continued to place strict limits on the right to a new trial, applying the test developed in Berry v. State. 103 Berry prohibits new trials unless the evidence was discovered after the time of the first trial, could not with "due diligence" have been discovered earlier, is not merely cumulative or impeaching, and is of such a nature that it will likely produce an acquittal on retrial.
10 4 The second listed factor is the most important for present purposes: if the defendant fails to use his best efforts to present his case at the first trial, he forfeits his right to present a complete defense. 105 The similarities among the alibi notice, contemporaneous-objection, and new-trial rules are clear: in each case the state requires the defendant to assert certain of his substantive rights in a manner designed to serve the efficient, orderly, and fair operation of the criminal justice system. A failure to comply with the rule may cause a forfeiture of the right. 108 These similarities strongly suggest that an application of the Alicea test would render the contemporaneous-objection and 102 The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. 106 In alibi notice cases, certain mitigating factors, such as those outlined infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text, may establish good cause and prompt a judge in his discretion to refuse to enforce the forfeiture.
[51:254
Berry rules unconstitutional.
Under the Alicea test, the value of contemporaneous-objection rules to the state would be weighed against the cost to the defendant, not of compliance with the rule, but of the procedural default resulting from non-compliance. 1 0 7 Contemporaneous objection permits resolution of issues while the circumstances are fresh in the minds of the parties and encourages correction by the trial judge of errors without time-consuming appeals and retrials. 1 0 8 A defendant who neglects to raise an objection at the proper time, however, may be wrongly convicted on the basis of prejudicial or unreliable evidence or as a result of improper jury instructions. Weighing these costs and benefits to a particular party at the time of appeal, as the Alicea court did, would likely result in the conclusion that the costs of forfeiture-wrongful conviction-outweigh the value to the state of the rule itself.
The Berry limitation on new trials serves similar state purposes: it promotes the efficient use of the judicial system's resources by forcing defendants to come forward with their claims and evidence as early as possible. As a result of that rule, however, a defendant who, through lack of diligence, fails to find exculpatory evidence in time for use at his first trial may be unable ever to present that evidence to a factfinder. Under Alicea, that result denies the accused his right to present a defense. Once again, balancing the state interest served against the loss of that right would suggest that the Berry rule is insupportable.
B. The Benefits to the State Versus the Defendant's Cost of Compliance
The flaw in the Alicea reasoning is its implicit assumption that the benefit to the state of the preclusion sanction must be weighed against the value of the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 1 0 9 In fact, the burden imposed by the alibi no-107 See supra text accompanying notes 89-95. 108 Spritzer, supra note 98, at 477. 1" Professor Clinton balances the same factors, value to the state versus the loss of defendant's right, to determine whether various procedural and evidentiary rules (including the alibi notice rule) violate the right to present a defense. Clinton, supra note 47, at 797.
While the application of that test to alibi notice rules is improper for the reasons offered here, such a standard should be used to judge rules that automatically infringe the defendant's right. Clinton properly employed this balancing test to analyze Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), for example. Clinton, supra note 47, at 806-10. In that case the accomplice was precluded from testifying at the defendant's trial by the automatic operation of the evidentiary rule; no effort by the defendant at any time would have permitted him to
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tice rule as enforced by the preclusion sanction is merely the conditioning of that right on compliance with a particular procedure, not the loss of the right itself. Therefore, the test of the preclusion sanction's constitutionality is properly stated as a balance between the value to the state of the notice rule and the cost to the defendant of complying with the rule.
The constitutionality of the preclusion sanction may be assessed by comparing its balance of costs to the defendant and benefits to the state to the similar balancing required in other procedural-default contexts. For example, it is virtually costless for a defendant to object contemporaneously to errors at trial and thereby to assert the right to have such errors corrected, while the benefits to the state are great. 11 0 The balance, therefore, tips heavily in favor of preserving the contemporaneous-objection rule and the benefits it provides to the state. Similarly, the Berry rule demands an exercise of "due diligence" in gathering evidence for trial. A defendant who offers at trial evidence resulting from that diligent effort effectively asserts his right to present his case before a fact-finder. Any exculpatory evidence that could not have been found with due diligence may then be offered at a new trial., 1 The cost of acting with "due diligence" can hardly be burdensome to a defendant who has already accepted the cost of preparing a defense, and it therefore is outweighed by the savings of the state in avoiding multiple trials of the same matter.
In the case of alibi notice rules, the costs of compliance are those involved in preparing an alibi defense before trial and in responding to the prosecutor's request for such information. None of the costs of compliance are severe enough to constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right.
11 2 The defendant has not failed to comply with the rule if his information is not complete at the time overcome the prohibition and redeem his right to compulsory process. For that reason the existence of the rule necessarily led to a denial of the right, and the balancing of the state's interest against the value of the right itself was appropriate.
Professor Westen has employed a balancing of the same factors in assessing the constitutionality of conditioning one right on the waiver of another. [ 51:254 1984] Alibi Notice Rules of the request; the continuing duty to disclose imposed by rules such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1(c) 113 requires the release of such information only as it is gathered, whether before or during trial. By contrast, although the Alicea court gainsaid the benefits of the alibi notice rule, 11 4 other courts and commentators have noted the increase in administrative efficiency in the trial process when such a rule is in place. 15 The costs, therefore, of asserting an alibi defense are as greatly outweighed by the benefits gained through avoidance of surprise alibis and the delays they can cause as the costs of the contemporaneous-objection and Berry rules are outweighed by their benefits. In sum, treating the preclusion sanction as the result of the defendant's own forfeiture of the right to present alibi witnesses preserves the benefits alibi notice rules provide to the state without jeopardizing the defendant's compulsory-process rights," 6 and hence, by comparison with the balance of costs and benefits struck with respect to other procedural default rules, should be upheld.
Finally, preclusion is the least severe effective means of securing the benefits of an alibi notice rule to the state. 116 Also analogous to the alibi notice rule preclusion sanction is forfeiture of certain defenses and objections under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. The details of the defenses and objections included in that rule are discussed in the cases cited supra note 100. If the defendant fails to raise any of these matters before trial, he loses the opportunity to raise them. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f). The benefits to the criminal justice system from requiring disposition of these matters before trial include preventing unnecessary trials, deterring interruption of trials for any objection relating to the institution and presentation of the charge, and eliminating from trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt. See supra note 100. If the defendant fails to raise these matters before trial, the forfeiture mechanism may cause him to lose, inter alia, his right to a legally selected, unbiased grand jury, his right to discovery, and his right to avoid the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. Once again, under the Alicea test, the loss of these trial rights outweighs the gain to the system from streamlined trials.
Employing the test this comment suggests dictates the opposite result. Consistent with the analysis presented here, the Supreme Court has approved the Rule 12 preclusion sanction. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) . Justice Rehnquist advanced two arguments in support of the sanction. First, the sanction was firmly rooted in precedent: the requirement that objections to the composition of a grand jury be raised before trial had been approved by the Supreme Court in 1883. Id. at 237 (citing United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883)). Second, the value to the criminal justice system of enforcing the rule outweighs the tactical value to the defendant of evading the rule's pretrial notice requirement and of raising various objections at trial, on appeal, or on collateral attack. Id. at 241. Thus the Court apparently balanced procedural costs and benefits, not procedural benefits versus the rights forfeited.
criticizing the preclusion sanction have proposed a number of alternatives. 117 These include granting a continuance when a surprise alibi arises at trial, 118 prohibiting further pretrial discovery by the defendant, 19 permitting the court or prosecutor to comment on the credibility of alibi evidence presented without prior notice, 1 2 0 imposing criminal sanctions for a willful failure to comply with the notice rule, 1 2 and imposing contempt sanctions against the defendant's attorney for a failure to comply. 2 2 Proponents of these alternatives claim that each provides a constitutionally acceptable means of enforcing alibi notice, and therefore that preclusion is unnecessary as well as unconstitutional. None of these proposed sanctions actually provides an effective alternative to preclusion. Permitting a continuance for further investigation as the sole sanction is equivalent to abolishing alibi notice altogether. 24 Even without an alibi notice rule, a continuance is available to the prosecution when unexpected evidence surfaces at trial.
2 5 The threat of a continuance provides no real incentive to the defendant to conform to the rule, and it may even prove to be attractive as part of a tactical strategy designed to stall the trial. 126 Prohibiting further pretrial discovery for a defendant who fails to give.alibi notice is also the equivalent of no sanction at all; the threat of the preclusion sanction does not arise until mid-trial, well after the opportunity to discontinue discovery is lost. Permitting comment to the jury on the validity of a surprise alibi is of doubtful constitutionality.
2 7 Criminal sanctions for a willful fail-117 Clinton, supra note 47, at 833-39; Note, supra note 11, at 1353-54. 218 Clinton, supra note 47, at 835; Note, supra note 11, at 1355, 1357. 11 Note, supra note 11, at 1358. 120 Clinton, supra note 47, at 835; Note, supra note 11, at 1358-59. ' Note, supra note 11, at 1359.
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Westen, supra note 47, at 138-39; Note, supra note 11, at 1359-60. Westen, supra note 47, at 138-39; Note, supra note 11, 1364. 12, See Epstein, supra note 2, at 36. 125 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1051 (West Supp. 1984) . 126 But see Alicea, 615 F.2d at 924 (arguing that such tactical moves will usually fail because there will be little surprise and hence no need for a continuance).
M First, such comment may serve to introduce, in a novel fashion, the a priori presumption of untrustworthiness disallowed in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) . See supra notes 52, 60-68 and accompanying text. Second, comment on a surprise alibi may violate due process by diminishing the prosecutor's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Court noted in Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), "[b]y creating an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden." Id. at 104. Finally, this alternative sanction may be analogized to the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination caused by comment on defendant's own failure to take the stand. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
ure to comply with a notice rule would likely provide little incentive to the defendant who already faces considerable punishment for the principal crime and who believes a surprise alibi provides a tactical advantage. 1 8 Finally, contempt sanctions against the lawyer would be at best ineffective, as experience with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11129 sanction shows. 130 At worst, contempt sanctions would create a conflict of interest between the defendant's desire to withhold alibi evidence as long as possible and the attorney's desire to avoid the sanction. This conflict would give the defendant an inducement to delay informing his attorney of alibi evidence in order to avoid having his attorney disclose the evidence rather than risk contempt. This inhibition impinges on the defendant's interest in the free flow of information to his attorney.
1 3 1
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In framing alibi notice rules, the goal of a state should be to minimize the costs of compliance while preserving the societal benefits the rule provides. As we have seen, the preclusion sanction is both constitutional and the least drastic effective means of preserving those benefits. Yet the burden the notice rule imposes on the defendant may be still further reduced by the adoption of a version of the rule which includes three elements: prosecutorial initiation, imposition of a flexible duty of disclosure, and judicial discretion.
A. Prosecutor-Triggered Rule
Federal Rule 12.1, like the rules in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, 1 32 requires the prosecutor to inform a defendant of his duty to provide pre-trial notice of an alibi defense. By triggering the process, the prosecutor ensures that the defendant's duty to provide notice, should he wish to present an alibi defense, is predicated on an awareness of the rule, thereby lowering the cost of compliance to the defendant. At the same time, since providing 128 The student note recommending this alternative recognized this drawback. Note, supra note 11, at 1359.
129 FEn. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring counsel to sign his pleading and attest that "he has read the pleading ... [and] ... it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by an existing law or a good faith argument for the extension . notice of the rule is a routine procedure, it does not impose an undue burden on the prosecutor. 33 As a state's goal should be to decrease the defendant's cost of compliance with the rule without diminishing the rule's value to the criminal justice system, it is entirely appropriate for states to adopt a prosecutor-triggered rule.
B. Flexible Duty to Disclose
Permitting the accused to release alibi information as he receives it, rather than only on a set day before trial,
13
lowers the cost of compliance by avoiding restrictions on the progress of the defendant's investigation. It is reasonable for the state to require a defendant to give notice on a set date of his intention to present an alibi defense, and to state the place he claims to have been at the time of the offense. Such disclosure allows the prosecution to develop evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the crime. Notification of such details as the names of witnesses, however, can be provided later without impinging on the state interest in avoiding surprise alibis, provided that such details are disclosed far enough in advance of the presentation of the defendant's case to permit investigation by the state. Indeed, it is in the interest of the defendant to provide such information as early as possible in order to receive reciprocal disclosure from the prosecutor. 35 
C. Judicial Discretion
The defendant's cost of compliance may be increased by an inability to locate an alibi witness, the inexperience of defense counsel, or some other unforeseeable event. For that reason it is proper that every alibi notice rule currently in effect gives the trial court some discretion in applying the sanction." 3 6 Federal courts consider five factors when determining whether good cause exists to suspend the preclusion sanction: the amount of prejudice to the opposing party that resulted from the failure to disclose; the reason for the failure to disclose; the extent to which the harm of the non-disclosure was mitigated by subsequent events; the weight of other, properly admitted, evidence for and against the defendant;
